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Hsu v. County of Clark, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 (Dec. 27, 2007)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – LAW OF THE CASE 
EMINENT DOMAIN – PER SE REGULATORY TAKINGS  
 
 
Summary 
 
 This case is an appeal from a district court order, entered on remand, dismissing an 
inverse condemnation action.  While the current appeal was pending, the Nevada Supreme Court 
decided an intervening case with substantively similar facts which changed Nevada law when 
analyzing airspace takings. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court determined that when it issues an intervening decision that 
constitutes a change in controlling law, courts may depart from the decided law of the case and 
apply the new rule of law.  Applying the new law to the present appeal, the Court vacated the 
district court’s dismissal and directed it to enter an order finding the County liable for a per se 
regulatory taking.  The Court also remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of just 
compensation. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
This case began as an eminent domain action with appellant filing a cross-claim for 
inverse condemnation.  At issue are two County ordinances placing transition zone height 
restrictions on property surrounding McCarran International Airport, including appellants’ land.  
The district court determined the county ordinances were a per se regulatory taking of airspace 
over appellants’ land.  The case then proceeded to trial on the issue of just compensation 
resulting in a substantial verdict for appellants.  On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded the case to allow appellants to exhaust their administrative remedies as required 
by Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.2  On remand, the district court directed 
appellants to submit a development plan to the County by January 1, 2006.  When appellants 
sold the land rather than file the plan, the district court dismissed the case.  Appellants then filed 
the present appeal.   
While the current appeal was pending, the Nevada Supreme Court decided McCarran 
International Airport v. Sisolak,3 a case based on similar facts.  In that case, the Court concluded 
that the county’s airport runway approach zone height restrictions constituted a per se regulatory 
taking as defined in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,4 and did not fall within the 
parameters of Penn Central.5  Therefore, Sisolak was not required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies before bringing suit.  This decision resulted in a substantive change to Nevada law and 
                                                 
1 By Diane L. Welch 
2 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
3 122 Nev. 645, 137 P.3d 1110 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1260 (2007). 
4 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
5 Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 666-67, 137 P.3d 1124-25. 
analyzing airspace takings claims.  Because the facts of this case are similar to those in Sisolak, 
appellants argue that they are entitled to the benefit of the intervening decision. 
  
Discussion 
 
I.  Law of the Case Doctrine 
 
 The law of the case doctrine provides that the law or ruling of a first appeal must be 
followed in all subsequent proceedings, both in the lower court and on any later appeal.6  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that it is not improper for a court to depart from 
a prior holding if it is “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”7  Federal courts 
have adopted three specific exceptions to the law of the case doctrine: (1) new or different 
evidence produced in subsequent proceedings, (2) an intervening change of controlling law, or 
(3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and enforcement would result in manifest injustice.8  
Additionally, many state courts have adopted one or all of these exceptions.9  The Nevada 
Supreme Court has also acknowledged possible exceptions to the law of the case in Clem v. State 
and Leslie v. Warden.10 
 Referencing these exceptions adopted by both federal and state courts, the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that “when the controlling law of this state is substantively changed during 
the pendency of a remanded matter at trial or on appeal, courts of this state may apply that 
change to do substantial justice.”11  In this case, the Court issued its opinion in Sisolak between 
the appellants’ first appeal and the current appeal and making a substantial change in Nevada law 
controlling airspace takings.  Therefore, the Court concluded the new law from Sisolak should 
apply to appellants’ claims. 
 
II.  The Effect of Sisolak 
 
 A.  Liability Determination 
 
 The Court determined in Sisolak that the County’s enactment of height restrictions which 
placed Sisolak’s property within McCarran Airport’s “runway approach zone” and “departure 
critical area” resulted in a per se regulatory taking.  The Court determined that Sisolak had a 
protected property interest in the use of his airspace up to 500 feet.12  However unlike Hsu, the 
Court determined Sisolak’s claims did not fall under Penn Central.  Because the ordinances were 
a permanent physical invasion of Sisolak’s airspace, they preserved a permanent right to fly 
through the airspace above Sisolak’s property.13  The Court further concluded that because the 
                                                 
6 Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615, 620, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003). 
7 Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983). 
8 Hsu v. County of Clark, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60, at 7-8. 
9  Id. at 8, n.19 and n.20. 
10 Id. at 8, n.21 and n.22. 
11 Hsu, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60, at 9-10. 
12 McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 655, 137 P.3d 1110, 1117 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1260 
(2007). 
13 Id. at 666-67, 137 P.3d at 1124-25. 
ordinances constituted a per se regulatory taking, Penn Central did not apply and Sisolak need 
not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a claim for inverse condemnation.14 
 Applying the rule from Sisolak to the current appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court found 
that the County’s transition zone height restrictions, like the restrictions in Sisolak, resulted in a 
per se regulatory taking of appellants’ airspace.  Quoting Sisolak, the Court stated “when airport 
regulations preserve the right to fly through a landowner’s airspace and planes actually make use 
of this airspace, this constitutes a permanent physical invasion of property and is properly 
categorized as a per se regulatory taking.”15  The Court also determined that based on the per se 
nature of the taking, appellants were not required to apply for a variance or exhaust their 
administrative remedies before bringing suit.  Therefore, the Court vacated the district court’s 
order dismissing the case and instructed the district court to enter an ordered finding the County 
liable for a per se regulatory taking. 
 
B.  Just Compensation, Attorney Fees, and Prejudgment Interest 
 
 Appellants requested the Court reinstate the original district court judgment awarding just 
compensation, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest.  The Court declined, finding the district 
court erred at the original trial by excluding testimony related to whether appellants could have 
obtained a variance from the transition zone height restrictions.16  The decision in Sisolak 
confirmed that such evidence is irrelevant in determining whether or not a taking occurred.  
However, this evidence is pertinent to determining the amount of just compensation due.17  The 
Court remanded the issue of just compensation to the district court in accordance with the 
Court’s ruling in Sisolak.  
 As indicated in Sisolak, appellants are entitled to reasonable attorney fees actually 
incurred as the successful property owner in an inverse condemnation action.18  The Court 
remanded the issue of appellants’ attorney fees to the district court with instructions to determine 
reasonable fees based upon the traditional lodestar analysis, with adjustments left to the 
discretion of the district court.19 
 Sisolak further provides for prejudgment interest to a prevailing party in an inverse 
condemnation action from the date of taking until the entry of judgment.20  The Court remanded 
the case for calculation and award to appellants of prejudgment interest from November 20, 
1995, the stipulated date of taking.21 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court determined that when the Nevada Supreme Court issues an intervening 
decision that constitutes a substantial change in controlling law, Nevada courts may depart from 
                                                 
14 Id. at 664, 137 P.3d at 1123. 
15 Hsu, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 at 14, quoting Sisolak at 666-67, 137 P.3d at 1124-25. 
16 Hsu, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 at 15. 
17 Id. citing Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 672, 137 P.3d at 1128. 
18 Sisolak, 122 Nev. 673-75, 137 P.3d at 1129-30 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (2000)). 
19 Herbst v. Humana Health Ins. of Nevada, 105 Nev. 586, 590, 781 P.2d 762, 764 (citing Pennsylvania v. Del. 
Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 564-66 (1986)). 
20 Sisolak, 122 Nev. 675, 137 P.3d at 1130. 
21 Hsu, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 at 17-18. 
the decided law of the case set forth in a first appeal and apply the new rule of law in subsequent 
proceedings.   
      Applying the intervening rule of law set forth in Sisolak to this case, the Court found 
appellants properly established a claim for per se regulatory taking of their airspace and were 
entitled to appropriate just compensation.  The Court vacated the district court’s dismissal and 
instructed the court to enter an order finding the County liable for a per se regulatory taking.  The 
case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of just compensation in accordance with the 
guidelines set forth in Sisolak and this opinion.  The Court further instructed the district court to 
calculate attorney fees using a lodestar analysis and calculate prejudgment interest based upon 
the stipulated date of taking. 
 
